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IMARES is:    
• an independent, objective and authoritative institute that provides knowledge necessary for an 
integrated sustainable protection, exploitation and spatial use of the sea and coastal zones; 
• an institute that provides knowledge necessary for an integrated sustainable protection, exploitation 
and spatial use of the sea and coastal zones; 
• a key, proactive player in national and international marine networks (including ICES and EFARO). 
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Summary 
The present report presents a summary of the content of the ex-post evaluation of the fishing agreement 
between the EU and Mauritania (reference below), and does not necessarily reflect the views of IMARES: 
Framework Contract FISH/2006/20 : 
Convention spécifique n°30 : Evaluation ex-post du protocole actuel d’accord de partenariat dans le 
domaine de la pêche entre l’Union Européenne et la Mauritanie, étude d’impact d’un possible future 
protocole d’accord. 
Rapport final 
Mars 2011 
 
1. Constitution of the report 
This report is made of 3 parts : 
The first one presents the general framework : geo-politic facts about Mauritania, macro-economic 
situation (with a particular emphasis on the importance of the fisheries sector in the economy of the 
country), public policies and help for development . 
The second part deals specifically with the fisheries sector, describing the main management measures 
applicable in Mauritania, the different fleets present and their catch, the state of fish stocks, the market 
of fish products, importance in terms of employment. 
The third part, dealing with the fishing agreements, presents the terms of the agreement, its socio-
economic consequences, the development of a partnership (policy, science, economy, control) and finally 
an evaluation of the agreements, in terms of achievements, of financial costs, relevance, and viability. 
 
2. Relevant facts about fisheries in Mauritania 
 
Fisheries management and control 
Fisheries activity is regulated by the ministry of fisheries and maritime economy, which is in charge of 
scientific research (IMROP), fisheries control (DSPCM), sea food healthiness (ONISPA), formation of 
fishermen (ENEMP). Fisheries ministry has limited human resources (structural limitations) but important 
financial resources due to the 11 M€ from the agreements for supporting the development of a policy for 
the fisheries sector. The money from the agreements is used as a complement to the ministry budget, 
whereas most the other financial help for development to this country work via projects funding. 
Fisheries management framework in Mauritania is mainly based on restricting the access to the resource, 
rather than on limiting the amount of catch allowed via species specific quotas as it is done in the EU. 
The main limiting measure is the existence of fishing rights (fishing licences) which apply to every fishing 
boat (national and foreign) willing to fish in the Mauritanian EEZ. There are various types of licences 
corresponding to the type of fishing vessels (artisanal, coastal, industrial) and the species targeted. 
Fishing licences fall under different regimes : for national boats, for foreign boats chartered by 
Mauritanian companies, and for foreign boats, either under fishing agreements (i.e. between Mauritania 
and other states) or privately. 
Besides licences, there are other restrictions, such as closed areas, technical measures on fishing gears, 
minimal landing size of the fish, limits on the proportion of by-catch species, seasonal closures, marine 
protected areas. For octopus, there is a management plan in place. 
Fisheries monitoring and control has received a lot of attention (including with the support of EU, France 
and Germany), and is the most developed in the north-western African region. EU vessels are frequently 
controlled and sanctioned for a variety of reasons (ranging from serious infringements such as fishing in 
closed areas to relatively minor ones). EU ship owners complain that they are being harassed by the 
Mauritanian control and often forced to acknowledge infringements (under the threat of being constraint 
to go to the harbour for further investigation, thereby losing fishing time). 
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Fleet composition 
The industrial fishing fleets in Mauritania are 75% demersal fishing vessels, 15% pelagic fishing vessels, 
and 10% tuna fleet, but in terms of gross tonnage, pelagic fishing vessels represent 75% of the fleet. 
The demersal fleet is composed of a cephalopod (mostly EU  and Mauritanian vessels with Chinese 
interests) and a shrimp (mostly EU and Mauritanian vessels) fishery , both showing a decrease in the 
number of vessels since 2003. 
The pelagic fleet is composed of very large industrial (either freezer or factory) fishing vessels, fishing 
under the EU-Mauritania agreements (EU fleet, 20 vessels), as vessels chartered by Mauritanian 
companies (9 vessels mostly Russians) and with free fishing licences (51 vessels mainly Russian and flag 
ship).  
The EU fleet represents 30% of the fishing effort (in terms of day of fishing). 
The other fishing fleets include a tuna fishing fleet (10 EU vessels and 15 other countries), and artisanal 
and coastal fleets, all Mauritanian (with occasionally Senegalese canoes). 
 
Catch in Mauritania 
Catch data for the industrial fleet come exclusively from log books, i.e. from declarations of the amount 
of catch by the skippers. There is no comparison with catch figures from the landing sites. This implies 
that there are potentially under-declaration of catches (likely for cephalopods). 
Catch from the industrial fleets in the recent years was of about 850 000 t of which 95% was pelagic fish 
(mainly horse mackerel and sardinella). There is no real trend in the volume of catches (rather stable for 
demersal fishes, and fluctuating for pelagic fish). 
The catch of EU fleets under the fishing agreements is on average 275 000t, of which 90% is pelagic fish, 
8% for demersal fisheries (half of it being cephalopods) and 2% tuna. They represent around 80% for 
the total Mauritanian shrimp catches, around 20% for the cephalopods and around 30% for the pelagic 
fish. 
The main species caught by the EU pelagic fleet are horse mackerel (35%), sardine (31%) and sardinella 
(28%). The EU fleet targeting shrimps has low by-catch (8% cephalopods and fish) but high discards. 
The EU fleet targeting cephalopods catch cephalopods and fish in the same proportion (also high 
discards). 
Catch for the artisanal fleets is of 90 000t. 
 
State of the stocks 
The national fisheries institute, IMROP is in charge of the scientific advice for the Mauritanian EEZ. The 
assessment of the stocks, which for most of them spread over several countries, is done during 
international working groups organised within the CECAF.  
The pelagic stocks exploited in Mauritania are migratory, and also fished in Morocco and/or Senegal. 
While the assessment of the stocks is done at the regional level, there is no real concerted management 
of the stocks between West African countries, each country deciding of the management of the fisheries 
in their own EEZ. The mathematical models used for the assessment of these stocks are more simple 
than the one used for most pelagic stocks (e.g. in the ICES sphere). This is mainly due to a lack of 
appropriate data to apply more sophisticated models which would represent better the dynamics of the 
stocks.  
The state of the stocks described in the report is the same as what was analysed during the previous 
meeting of the Joint Scientific Committee (see CVO nota 24 November 2010 in annex) and is not 
discussed further here . 
Besides its direct effects on the targeted fish stocks, the fishery in Mauritania has a range of other 
impacts, going from high discard rate in the cephalopod and shrimp fisheries, impacts on the trophic 
structure of the ecosystem, detrimental effect of the fishing gears on the bottom, loss of fishing gears in 
the sea, the catch of endangered species (dolphins turtles or sharks). 
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3. Relevant points about the evaluation of the agreements 
 
Fisheries agreements with Mauritania is the most important for the EU (86 million EU per year, while 36 
and 15 million EU for the agreements with Morocco and Guinea). 
The financial compensation for the fishing agreements is divided into fishing rights (75 M€ in 2006 
decreasing to 50 M€ in 2012) and support to the development of a policy for the fisheries sector (11M€ 
in 2006 to 20 M€ in 2012) channelled through the ministry of fisheries. There were problems with the 
use of this envelope for sectorial policy support : financially, it was difficult to integrate this money in the 
financial system of the ministry. Then part of the funds was used for financing the functioning of the 
ministry while it should have been used to start new projects or make new investments. This problems 
were later sorted out by new agreements between Mauritania and EU. 
The money from the fishing agreements contributed to improve scientific research capacity, fisheries 
control, sea food healthiness control, and to renew landing facilities (but not to the expected level, new 
installations had to be built but that did not happen because it was too complex to organise).  
Use of fishing possibilities by the EU fleet : for shrimp and cephalopods fisheries, 100% of the licences 
were used in the earlier period of the agreements (2006-2008) decreasing to 70%. As the number of 
licences was reduced afterwards, the rate of use was close to 100% again. For the pelagic fleet, during 
the earlier period, the rate of use was low, but increase after 2008 because the fishery attracted more 
vessels and at the same time the number of licences was reduced. The quota (applying to all pelagic 
species combined) has been overshoot during the last two years (by 39%). 
EU ship owners paid 10M€ per year in addition to the 87 M€ from public money –(proportion similar as 
for the other fishing agreements). The income for the EU fleets is 186 M€ (per year) of which 50% comes 
from the pelagic fisheries. The added value by the EU fleet and fisheries sector is 162M€ of which only 
13% generated in Mauritania (because the fish is not landed there). 
In terms of employment : the fishing agreements concerns 2200 fishers (1 third EU, 1 third Mauritania, 1 
third others). It is an obligation for the EU vessels fishing under the agreement to have Mauritanian 
seamen on board. This helped to improve the employment rate of Mauritanian fishermen, and offered 
them a training opportunity on modern efficient fishing technics.  
The partnership worked well in terms of development of a fisheries policy in Mauritania. The scientific 
partnership (joint scientific committee) met as planned. It’s role in terms of providing scientific advice on 
the exploitation of fish stocks was not very develop, since most of its conclusion were taken from the 
CECAF recommendations. The committee had also a plan for scientific actions, which were very slowly 
carried out. There is a lack EU scientists involvement in this committee. Only the part of the partnership 
agreement promoting European investments in the fishery sector in Mauritania was not successful at all, 
Mauritania is not seen as an attractive place for investments. 
 
Post ex evaluation of the agreements :  
were those agreements successful in terms of realisations ? 
a. Efficient in providing some support for the EU distant fishing fleets. 
b. Not playing its role in the stabilisation of EU sea food market (as most of the catch is 
pelagic fish which is not sold on the EU market), and for the employment in the fisheries 
products sector. 
c. The development of the Mauritanian fisheries industry has been weak (too limited 
interaction between EU fishing companies and fisheries sector in Mauritania, except for 
an increasing number of EU vessels in Nouadhibou). 
d. Support to the fisheries policy in Mauritania : improvements were made (scientific 
research, enforcement, fleet monitoring) but no construction of new major installations 
(e.g. harbour). 
e. As a conclusion : fisheries sector in Mauritania still has the same problem as before : 
overcapacity in the fisheries, lack of appropriate installations, weakness of the 
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management system, all resulting in a stagnation of this sector of the Mauritanian 
economy. 
 
Were those agreements successful in financial terms :  
very high cost for these few results : 
f. Cost of the agreements for the EU is large compared to the profit made by for the EU 
fleet (the cost for EU is about 40% of income generated by the EU fleet) 
g. Agreements money represents 80% of the revenue of the fishing sector in Mauritania, 
but for only 29% of the total catch taken in the EEZ. 
For 1€ paid by the EU, 1.4€ of added value is generated, which is a ratio similar as for the 
other fisheries agreements (except the ones for tuna). 
 
Was it relevant to have those agreements ? 
The agreements provided an access to a resource of distant seas fishing fleets : in many instances this 
prevented fishing vessels from having to stop their fishing activity, or from being sold to other countries 
(e.g. for Andalucian fleets). 
For Mauritania, the agreements provided a secured and stable income on the midterm; which makes it 
possible to use this money in a well-planned and more rational way (than giving access to their resource 
on the basis of individual licences as it is done with other foreign countries and is not as stable in terms 
of income).  
 
The agreements are beneficial for the viability of the EU fleets, and the EU fishing sector. No impact on 
the economic viability of the Mauritanian industrial fleet (slightly negative though because it creates a 
overcapacity for the octopus fishery). The ecological viability of the agreement is problematic : the 
agreement results in an excessive fishing effort on the pelagic stocks and on the some of the demersal 
stocks, generates important discards, and potentially affects sensitive marine habitats. However, 
excluding the EU fleet would not entirely solve these problems since other foreign fleets and the 
Mauritanian fleet also significantly participate to the excess of fishing capacity and impact on the 
ecosystem. 
 
4. Conclusion : 
 
For Mauritania, the agreements had some positive points: the agreements money contributed to the 
development of a policy for the fisheries sector. The agreements are beneficial for the employment and 
training of Mauritania fishermen. 
But the agreement was not optimal for Mauritania in term of the economic gains generated by their fish 
resources : on the one hand, the agreements generated an important income for the country (the fishing 
licences paid by EU companies), but on the other hand, most of the potential added value escapes from 
Mauritania, due to the limited interaction between the EU fleet exploiting the fish and the Mauritanian 
industry (only use the landing facility, but no transformation of the fishing products in Mauritania, no 
maintenance on the vessels…). Similarly, the agreements contribute to the employment of Mauritanian 
fishermen, but could generate more employment if the catch was landed and processed in the country. 
No economic partnership was developed between EU and Mauritanian companies, the facilities onshore 
have improved, but there was no construction of new major installations. 
The presence of the EU fleets contributes to the overcapacity in Mauritanian fisheries. For some fisheries, 
most the fishing pressure is due to EU vessels (shrimp, demersal fish). This situation generates a 
competition for the resource and hampers the development of the national coastal and artisanal fleets. 
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For other fisheries the importance of the EU effort is lesser (around 30% of the catch of small pelagic 
overall), and there is less overlap with the artisanal fisheries.  
 
For the EU, the agreements allowed to maintain some vessels in activity (Spanish vessels) and provided 
a compensation for the decrease in fishing quotas in Europe of the pelagic fleet. Most of the catch from 
Mauritania is not sold on the EU fish market (pelagic fish). Most of the added value of these fisheries is 
for the EU economy. But the public cost seems to be high compared to this added value.  
 
Though the agreements may have been beneficial for the scientific research (contribution of the 
agreement money to the functioning of IMROP), their impact in terms of cooperation was weak. Most of 
the cooperation was bilateral (Mauritania-Spain, Mauritania-Netherlands) and the role of the joint 
scientific committee was limited. It consisted more in providing a platform for discussion between the 
different parties (i.e. scientists from IMROP, from European institutes, and the European commission) on 
on-going projects rather than in generating new ideas for future joint research programs. In terms of 
advice on fish stock exploitation, there was no added value from the agreements (i.e. the Joint Scientific 
Committee) compared to the advice produced within CECAF (given that many experts of the JSC also 
attend CECAF working groups).  
The lack of a regional management body is a problem for the management of pelagic stocks, which are 
shared and migrate through different countries of the sub-region. For these stocks a species specific TAC 
should be set based on the advice provided by the CECAF, and split into national quotas. 
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Appendix A. CVO nota 10.IMA0924 - 24 November 2010 
 
 
Meeting of the Joint Scientific Committee on the Fishing Agreements between the European Union and  
Mauritania, October 5-7 2010, Cadiz-Spain 
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